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ABSTRACT

Hospitality firms are susceptible to data breaches due to the high volume of information they keep
on customers and employees. In this paper, we first present an analysis of the stock market’s reaction
to data breaches at hospitality firms, and we compare these breaches to a matched-firm sample of
retail firm breaches. Abnormal stock market returns indicate that hotel and restaurant firm stock
prices went down by approximately 1.24% from data breach announcements. We find that the type
of breach or number of times a firm has been breached does not alter the impact of a breach on firm
returns. Additionally, we find that data breaches cause a greater loss of value for hotel firms than
for restaurants. Finally, we find no support for the idea that hospitality firms exhibit larger negative
effects compared to retail firms on a matched-pair analysis.
Keywords: CAPM, data breach, event study, stock returns

1 Introduction and Study Context
Organizations of all types have become increasingly
susceptible to data breaches, and data breaches, via
hacking and other exposures, are growing more
common. Breaches are leading to more costs, occasional fines, and more claims being paid out as the
cyber liability market matures. The Ponemon Institute’s 2015 study, Cost of data breach: Global analysis,
found that German and U.S. companies experienced
the highest total cost of data breaches, with the U.S.
at $5.4 million, on average, in 2013.
Data breaches occur in many forms, which
include hacking, stolen or lost equipment, and poor
data handling processes. Hotels and restaurants are
not exempt from this increasing trend, and they may
be more susceptible to data breaches because of the
volume of information residing in their systems,

including credit card data, confidential information
for loyalty programs, and employee data. Easy access
to wireless networks, the use of physical point-of-
sale devices within hotel restaurants and bars, and
a multitude of employees with access to guest information all increase the risk. According to a data
breach investigation conducted by SpiderLabs’s
2015 Trustwave Global Security Report, criminals
go after the food and beverage industry because it
tends to have high transaction volumes. Criminals
have found that these organizations have a low barrier to entry from an infiltration standpoint. SpiderLabs’s 2015 report found that the hospitality and
food and beverage industry formed 33% of the
primary targets of cyber criminals in 2012. Additionally, a study reported in Hospitality Technology
(2017) indicated that 74% of hotels do not have data
breach protection. In this same article John Bell,
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founder of the security consulting firm Ajontech
LLC, stated that “hackers love hospitality.” Thus, it
seems that hospitality firms may have higher data
breach costs and exposure compared to other retail
firms. Additionally, it is unclear within the hospitality industry whether hotels or restaurants have
greater value and risk exposure to data breaches.
This is because two possibly offsetting effects exist.
Hotels, because of their low level of preparedness,
may be worse off than restaurant firms. On the other
hand, restaurants have a very high rate of transactions and may be more exposed to data breach loss
than hotel firms. If a difference exists, it is unclear
which type of firm will suffer a greater decline in
value from a data breach.
The true cost of a data breach is not limited to the
financial consequences of lost business and exposure
to third party liability; there are also risks related to
reputation ranging from significant to catastrophic.
This paper analyzes the consequences of data breach
incidents in hotel and restaurant firms: the effect of
the announcement of data breaches on stock value.
Previous studies have looked at the effect of data
breaches on different groups of firms. This paper is
the first to examine a sample of events consisting
exclusively of firms in the hospitality industry. This
paper aims to identify the economic importance of
data breaches in the hospitality industry from an
investor’s viewpoint.
1.1 Outline of the Paper

Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature and provides the paper’s hypotheses.
Section 3 explains the research design for the event
study portion of the paper and describes the sample
firms used in our event study, event study methodology, and the firm and breach characteristics that
affect the abnormal return of the firms. Results of
the event study are presented in Section 4. Section 5
summarizes the findings and contributions of the
research.
2 Previous Event Studies in Hospitality
Finance
The usefulness of event study methodology is well-
established in hospitality literature. Previous event
studies have examined a variety of factors that may

impact shareholder value in the hospitality industry including: initial public offerings (Canina,
1996), acquisitions (Canina, 2001; Ma & Chowdry,
2011), terrorism (Chang & Zeng, 2011), travel promotion (Johnson, Singh, & Ma, 2015), federal tax
policy (Johnson & Johnson, 2016), etc. There are
no published papers in hospitality literature that
have used event study methodology to examine the
impact of data breaches on firm value. However,
there are numerous examples of event studies outside the hospitality literature that have examined the
effects of data breach on other industries.
The implicit assumption in this methodology
is that the financial markets respond to news that
affect a security’s value, so change in stock price is
a good proxy for the impact of a given event. The
event study methodology assumes that returns on a
stock are significantly impacted by an event of interest. Overall, previous studies found that the market discriminates breached companies in the first
few days following the public announcement of the
breach.
However, no previous studies have investigated
the impact of security breaches on hospitality firms.
This study considers the impact of data breaches
on hospitality firm values. Additionally, the study
compares the hospitality firm data breaches to a
matched-pair set of retail firm data breaches.
2.1 Literature Review of Data Breach Event
Studies and Possible Factors Impacting the Size of
Abnormal Returns

The results in event study literature that examine
data breaches and firm value provide mixed and
possibly contradictory results. Some studies found
significant negative firm value effects associated
with data breaches and some did not. Some studies found that malicious data breaches, hacking,
cause more harm and other studies did not. Finally,
one study found that a repeat data breach is more
detrimental to firm value and some did not. For a
summary of the results of previous event studies, see
Table 1 below. The studies in Table 1 all utilized the
capital asset pricing model to determine the abnormal returns associated with data breach information
reaching the marketplace. Studies vary in size from
22 firm breach events over a 7-year period to 467
breach events over a 10-year period.

		

Table 1.
Author

Acquisti
et al.
Campbell
et al.
Cavusoglu
et al.
Garg
et al.
Gatzlaff
et al.
Hovav
et al.
Johnson
et al.
Kannan
et al.
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Summary of Previous Data Breach Event Studies
Publication
Date

Sample
Size

Category of Firm
Type

Data Years

Window

CAAR
Entire
Sample

Hacking
More
Negative?1

Repeat
More
Negative?1

2006

79

Broad Sample

2000–2006

2-day

−0.58%

No

N.A.

2003

43

Broad Sample

1995–2000

3-day

Yes

N.A.

2004

66

Broad Sample

1996–2001

2-day

Not
Significant
−2.1%

No

N.A.

2003

22

1996–2002

3-day

−5.3%

N.A.

N.A.

2010

77

Denial Of Service
Attacks (Hacking)
Broad Sample

2004–2006

2-day

−0.46%

No

Yes

2003

23

Internet Only Firms

1998–2002

3-day

N.A.

N.A.

2017

467

Broad Sample

2005–2014

3-day

Not
Significant
−0.37%

No

No

2004

102

50% Viruses

1998–2002

4-day

Not
Significant

No

No

1. N.A. is defined as not applicable. Many of the previous studies did not examine the possibility that hacking or repeat breaches are more
destructive to firm value.

Five of the eight studies examined a broad range
of breach types across many industries (Acquisti,
Friedman, & Telang, 2006; Campbell, Lawrence,
Loeb, & Zhou, 2003; Cavusogul, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004; Gatzlaff & McCullough, 2010; Johnson, Kang, & Lawson, 2017). In these broad-sample
based studies the results range from 0 to −2.1%.
Johnson et al. (2017), with the largest sample size of
467, reported a −0.37% return associated with the
average data breach. The preponderance of the evidence seems to indicate that the average data breach
is bad news for a firm’s value but is of modest economic significance.
Of the three studies that are not broad based,
the one that may be of greatest interest here is the
Garg, Curtis, and Harper (2013) study that found,
for a sample of denial of service hacks, there is a very
large significant −5.3% abnormal return. Denial
of service is a type of hacking where the hacker
degrades the ability of the corporation to serve customers and other stakeholders through their IT services and websites. This includes but is not limited
to slowing down the firm’s website, stopping legitimate access through viruses, etc. This result is much
more severe than that reported in all other studies.
In general agreement with this result, Campbell
et al. (2003) found in their broad sample of firms
that hacking breaches are significantly more negative than other data breaches. On the other hand,
Johnson et al. (2017); Kannan, Rees, and Sridhar

(2011); and Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) found
that hacking events are not more deleterious to firm
value. Thus, it is unclear from the previous evidence
whether breach type impacts the size of the returns
associated with the data breach.
The final two studies, Kannan et al. (2011) and
Hovav and D’Arcy (2003), were based on relatively
narrow samples of breaches. In the Kannan et al.
(2011) study 50% of the breaches were viruses attacking the company’s computer system. These virus
attacks can be viewed as a type of hacking event. To
put this in perspective, only 22% of the data breaches
in the Johnson et al. (2017) study of 467 breaches were
hacking events. The Hovav and D’Arcy (2003) study
was limited to the examination of Internet firms.
Because of the limited scope of these studies it is difficult to obtain reasonable inferences for the average
publicly traded firm or the hospitality industry.
Several of the studies went on to examine whether
a repeat data breach has a different impact on a firm’s
value than an original event. Here a repeat breach is
described as a second, third, or subsequent breach
experienced by a firm within the timespan of the
study. Hence a breach that is described in a study
as a first breach could in fact be a repeat breach in
that an earlier breach occurred prior to the horizon of the study. Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010)
found that repeat breaches do cause a more negative response to breaches than first-time events. The
Gatzlaff study was based on 77 breach events over a
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three-year period. On the other hand, Johnson et al.
(2017), with a broad-based sample of 467 breaches,
and Kannan et al. (2011), with a narrow sample, both
found no greater negative effect for repeat breaches.
Therefore, the evidence, while inconclusive, leans in
the direction of finding no repeat effect.
The issues investigated in this paper arise from
the discussion of Section 1, the introduction to the
paper, and Section 2.1, previous event study results.
Two sets of issues will be addressed. The first issue
is determining the average impact of a data breach
on hospitality firms. The hypothesis for this issue
is presented in Section 2.2 below. The second set of
issues asks whether some types of data breaches, or
types of firms, create a different abnormal return
than others. In Section 2.3 below there are two
hypotheses that examine types of data breaches. The
first breach type is malicious data breaches (MAL),
which include hacking and insiders misusing data.
The second type is repeat (REPEAT) data breaches.
In Section 2.3 there are also two hypotheses that
examine whether firm type matters. The first of
these hypotheses examines whether restaurants are
differentially impacted compared to hotels. The last
hypothesis addresses whether hospitality firms are
uniquely worse off in comparison to other retail
firms.
2.2 Market Reaction to Data Breaches

The first goal of this paper is to discover the extent to
which data breaches impact the value of firms in the
hospitality industry. The previous literature seems
to indicate that the overall impact on firms experiencing data breaches is either negative or zero.
Five of the eight studies found a significant negative
effect associated with data breaches and three did
not. Hence, our first hypothesis, stated in the null,
becomes:
H1: There is no average abnormal stock market
reaction to reports of corporate data breaches
in hotels and restaurants.
2.3 Cross-Sectional Determinants of Market
Reaction

We also develop four hypotheses about how the
impact of a data breach on a given firm will vary

with the firm’s competitive situation and the characteristics of the data breach. The first competitive
factor is based on the nature of the security breach.
We identify five types of data breaches across our
sample of hotel and restaurant data breach events.
These data breach types are listed in Panel B of
Table 2 and include insider (INSD), unintended
disclosure (DISC), physical loss (PHYS), hacking or
malware (HACK), and portable device (PORT). Two
of these types of data breaches, INSD and HACK,
are based on malicious acts. Insiders that have legitimate access to data but inappropriately release that
data (INSD) are engaging in a malicious act. Similarly, hacking or malware attacks (HACK) are malicious acts in which an external party, through
malware or spyware, seeks and exploits weaknesses
in a computer system or computer network. One
previous study found that malicious breaches are
more disruptive than other breaches and five studies
found no evidence of a differential effect.
Thus, stated in the null, our hypothesis becomes:
H2a: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of
abnormal negative returns that result from
MAL breaches will not differ from all other
types of breach.
The second factor that may influence the magnitude of the impact from a data breach is a repeated
occurrence. One previous study found that repeat
breaches were more negative than original breaches,
but two studies found no difference. If negative
abnormal returns are greater for firms experiencing
multiple breaches during the time frame examined
in our sample, it may suggest that investors react
more strongly to firms that fail to take appropriate
measures to protect sensitive information after a
breach incident occurs for the first time.
Thus, stated in the null, our hypothesis becomes:
H2b: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of
abnormal negative returns due to a privacy
breach is not different for events that are a
repeated occurrence of a privacy breach.
The third factor that we consider is the magnitude
of the impact of a data breach on hotel firms compared to restaurant firms. The Verizon 2012 data
breach investigation report showed that the most
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Table 2. Sample Firms and Data Breach Types
PANEL A: Hospitality Firm Names, Breach Dates, Ticker, and Type of Breach
Breach
Event

Company Name

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Flanigans Enterprises, Inc.
Cheesecake Factory, Inc.
Cheesecake Factory, Inc.
Cheesecake Factory, Inc.
Choice Hotels International, Inc.
Denny’s Corp.
Domino’s Pizza, Inc.
Starwood Hotels
Jack In The Box, Inc.
Marriott International, Inc. New
Marriott International, Inc. New
McDonald’s Corp.
McDonald’s Corp.
McDonald’s Corp.
McDonald’s Corp.
McDonald’s Corp.
McDonald’s Corp.
McDonald’s Corp.
McDonald’s Corp.
Papa John’s Intl, Inc.
Starbucks Corp.
Starbucks Corp.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp.
Wyndham Worldwide Corp.

Original Event
Date

Ticker

Type of Breach

Mkt Cap in
Billions

05/20/2011
05/24/2010
09/13/2010
09/29/2010
04/26/2012
09/30/2013
06/18/2008
03/08/2010
02/22/2011
12/28/2005
02/07/2011
12/14/2010
08/09/2011
09/12/2011
11/07/2011
11/16/2011
03/09/2012
04/30/2012
02/07/2013
11/07/2005
11/03/2006
11/24/2008
02/16/2009
03/01/2010

BDL
CAKE
CAKE
CAKE
CHH
DENN
DPZ
HOT
JACK
MAR
MAR
MCD
MCD
MCD
MCD
MCD
MCD
MCD
MCD
PZZA
SBUX
SBUX
WYN
WYN

INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
DISC
PHYS
PHYS
HACK
INSD
PORT
PHYS
HACK
INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
DISC
PORT
PORT
HACK
HACK

0.05
2.30
2.30
2.30
3.28
0.85
5.22
14.56
2.92
22.38
22.38
93.73
93.73
93.73
93.73
93.73
93.73
93.73
93.73
2.17
62.54
62.54
10.46
10.46

PANEL B: Description of Type of Breaches Observed in Hospitality Firms
Data Breach
Type
DISC
HACK
INSD
PHYS
PORT
REPEAT

Unintended disclosure: Sensitive information posted publicly on a website, mishandled, or sent to the wrong party via
email, fax, or mail.
Hacking or malware: Electronic entry by an outside party, malware and spyware that is malicious in nature.
Insider: Someone with legitimate access intentionally breaches information, such as an employee or contractor with
malicious intent.
Physical loss: Lost, discarded, or stolen non-electronic records, such as paper documents.
Portable device: Lost, discarded, or stolen laptop, PDA, smartphone, portable memory device, CD, hard drive, data tape,
etc.
A proxy for breaches that represent a repeated occurrence for the individual firm within the time frame of the
study.

reported data breach incidents in 2012 were from
accommodation and food services, and around
95% of these were restaurants while the remaining
5% were hotels. On the other hand, as discussed in
the introduction, hotels may be less prepared for
data breaches than restaurant firms. Thus, the value
exposure of restaurants and hotels may be significantly different in either direction.
H2c: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of abnormal
negative returns is not significantly different
in hotels than in restaurants.
Lastly, we compare the magnitude of abnormal
negative returns in the hospitality industry with

that of the retail industry off-sample that consists
of breaches with similar breach types and firm size
as the sample of hospitality breaches. While we
do not have a study that specifically suggests this
hypothesis, we do have a statement from John Bell
in Hospitality Technology (2017) that “hackers love
hospitality.” This seems to suggest that hospitality
firms may be more heavily exposed to data breaches
than other retail consumer-oriented activities. Thus,
stated in the null, our hypothesis becomes:
H2d: Ceteris paribus, the magnitude of
abnormal negative returns is not different for
a set of matched-pair retail firms as compared
to hospitality firms.
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3 Event Study Research Design
This section discusses the data and research design
used in the study.
3.1 Sample Firms

The sample used for this study consists of instances of
data breaches that publicly traded entities in the hospitality industry have been susceptible to in the past
10 years. The list of breaches appears in Table 2. This
sample was derived by collecting a list of all data
breaches from the last 10 years from Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse. We chose this medium for selecting
our sample because we wanted to develop a sample that was representative of the sum of information security breaches. Our search for information
security breaches covers the period of January 2005
through December 2014. The raw dataset obtained
from Privacy Rights Clearinghouse contained 1,715
data breach events in sectors including business, educational institutions, government/military, health
care/medical providers, and nonprofit organizations.
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse obtains its lists through
federal and state government reports, reports in major
newspapers, and online reports of data breaches. This
list was sorted for publicly traded companies in the
United States that operate in the restaurant and hotel
business. This narrowed our initial selection down to
31 data breach events and 15 unique publicly listed
U.S. firms.
Additional sample selection criteria are the availability of sufficient returns history (i.e., a minimum
public trading history) from the Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) database for the estimation period necessary for our event study, continuity in the corporate entity’s identity over the period,
and elimination of multiple events where estimation
periods overlap earlier events for the same firm.1
Seven events were eliminated, leaving us with 24
observations and 13 unique publicly listed U.S. firms
in the hotel and restaurant business.

Two of the events that were eliminated from the
initial sample selection were due to the unavailability of sufficient returns history on the CRSP
database. These data breach events are the Burger
King Worldwide, Inc. (BKW) insider breach on
February 27, 20122 and the Las Vegas Sands Corp.
(LVS) hacking on February 12, 2014.3 Another two
events were eliminated due to confounding occurrences around the data breach event date. The first
firm, Domino’s Pizza, Inc. (DPZ), had a data breach
on May 12, 2011, and made several significant
announcements around this period. On April 27,
2011, Domino’s Pizza, Inc. announced the acquisition of a majority stake in the exclusive master
franchise to own, operate, and franchise Domino’s
Pizza stores in Germany. On May 5, 2011, the group
announced its first quarter results and on May 18,
2011, it was awarded the “chain of the year” award
for the third time back-to-back. The second firm,
Wyndham Worldwide Corp. (WYN), had a data
breach on June 12, 2013, that was eliminated due
to a Florida law that protected timeshare owners
signed on June 13, 2013. Wyndham Vacation Ownership, a member of Wyndham Worldwide’s family
companies, as reported in a 2013 press release, is the
world’s largest vacation ownership business as measured by the number of vacation ownership resorts,
individual vacation ownership units, and owners of
vacation ownership interests.
Wendy’s Company and McDonald’s Corp. also
had breach events that were eliminated from the
sample. The Wendy’s Company (WEN) had two
events that had to be eliminated because the events
occurred in 2007 and 2008 under the name Triarc
Companies, Inc. and operated as a holding company for varied businesses. The last event eliminated
was the McDonald’s Corp. (MCD) data breach on
November 18, 2011, because it overlapped with the
event window of the data breach on November 16,
2011. Table 2 provides a list of the 24 events and the
relevant firms, their ticker symbols, the date the data
breaches were reported, and the type of breach.

When there is an overlap in the estimation period with a prior event for the same firm, we use the earlier event reporting
date.
2
Burger King Holdings, Inc. (BKC) was delisted in October 2010 and then listed again in June 2012 as Burger King Worldwide, Inc.
3
At the time of writing, there was no availability of sufficient returns history (i.e., a minimum public trading history) for the year
2014 in the CRSP database.
1

		

Table 3.
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One-to-One Matched Pair of Retail Firm

Off-Sample

PERMNO

Company Name

Original
Event Date

Ticker

Type

Mkt Cap
in Billions

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

84255
91391
75489
86580
89757
90396
46922
85914
59010
39087
39917
25785
12369
19502
19502
19502
19502
77418
17005
10517
89954
27828
89217
42585

Seachange International, Inc.
Windstream Corp.
Staples, Inc.
Nvidia Corp.
Sears Holdings Corp.
Cubesmart
Rite Aid Corp.
Best Buy Company, Inc.
GAP, Inc.
Sprint Nextel Corp.
Weyerhaeuser Co.
Ford Motor Co. Del
General Motors Corp.
Walgreen Co.
Walgreen Co.
Walgreen Co.
Walgreen Co.
Time Warner, Inc. New
CVS Corp.
Aarons, Inc.
DirecTV Group, Inc.
Hewlett Packard Co.
Advance Auto Parts, Inc.
Smucker J. M. Co.

09/08/2010
01/27/2012
02/02/2012
01/13/2013
01/07/2008
02/03/2012
07/27/2010
05/06/2011
04/16/2010
01/22/2007
08/10/2006
05/05/2012
08/03/2012
03/11/2011
02/15/2013
12/20/2013
06/07/2014
07/28/2010
03/09/2011
10/22/2013
10/11/2006
12/11/2008
03/31/2008
03/04/2014

SEAC
WIN
SPLS
NVDA
SHLD
CUBE
RAD
BBY
GPS
S
WY
F
GM
WAG
WAG
WAG
WAG
TWX
CVS
AAN
DTV
HPQ
AAP
SJM

INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
DISC
PHYS
PHYS
HACK
INSD
PORT
PHYS
HACK
INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
INSD
DISC
PORT
PORT
HACK
HACK

0.27
4.80
9.20
12.32
3.54
4.08
5.52
12.47
17.27
19.67
18.01
65.51
60.95
65.20
65.20
65.20
65.20
71.71
104.82
2.11
43.21
60.54
10.99
11.64

3.2 Off-Sample Firms

To compare the sample of hospitality firms to non-
hospitality firms, an off-sample of retail firms were
selected. A list of these off-sample, matched fi
 rms is
provided in Table 3.
The off-
sample consists of instances of data
breaches that publicly traded entities in the retail
industry have been susceptible to in the past
10 years. This sample was derived by collecting a
list of all data breaches from the last 10 years from
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse. The raw dataset
obtained from Privacy Rights Clearinghouse contained 1,715 data breach events in sectors including business, educational institutions, government/
military, health care/medical providers, and nonprofit organizations. This list was then sorted for
publicly traded companies in the United States that
operate in the retail industry as defined by Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse. Twenty-four matched events
were selected such that the events were the same
breach type and the nearest market capitalization
(based on 2015 values) available as those in Table 2.
Additional sample selection criteria are the availability of sufficient returns history (i.e., a minimum
1
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public trading history) from the CRSP database for the
estimation period necessary for our event study, continuity in the corporate entity’s identity over the period,
and elimination of multiple events where estimation
periods overlap earlier events for the same firm.1
3.3 Test of Market Reaction

The first hypothesis is tested by examining the
overall industry market reaction to the reporting
date of each data breach event. The market reaction was determined by measuring daily abnormal
returns (ARs), i.e., the difference between actual
and expected returns. To control for the effects of
market-wide fluctuations, the market model is used
to measure expected returns:
Rit = αi + βiRmt + eit

(1)

where:
Rit
αi

is the return for the ith data breach event
on day t,
is the intercept for the ith data breach
event,

When there is an overlap in the estimation period with a prior event for the same firm, we use the earlier event reporting date.
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βi
Rmt
eit

is the slope coefficient for the ith data
breach event,
is the return on an equal-weighted market
portfolio on day t,
is the error term with mean zero.

Following the conventions of previous studies
(e.g. Hughes, Magat, & Ricks, 1986; Jarrell & Peltzman, 1985; and the findings of Brown & Warner
[1980, pp. 242–243]; Brown & Warner [1985, p. 12];
and Binder & Summer [1985, p. 173]), an equal-
weighted market index is used as a proxy for the
market rate of return. The parameters αi and βi were
estimated for the event by using 255 trading days
of daily return data. Generally, in event studies, we
want the parameters of the model to be estimated
over a short time period before the event occurs.
This involves a trade-off. The closer the estimation
period is to the event period, the less likely it is that
sample firm betas have changed due to changes in
leverage, management strategy, and firm investments, etc. But estimation data from a period too
close to the event period may be contaminated
information leakage. We choose to estimate the
parameters of the model using 255 days of data
prior to each data breach event reporting date. We
did this to, as much as possible, avoid confounding
information about the data breach event that could
potentially bias the estimates. Once the parameters
αi and βi have been estimated for each firm, the daily
prediction errors (abnormal returns) for firm i were
calculated as follows:
ARit = Rit –(αi + ΒiRmt )

is too small will not fully capture the effects of
information leakage or slow market adjustment.
We choose a window of three days. Thus, our results
are reasonably conservative and should cover a significant amount of the impact of the data breach.
Table 1 reveals that the choice of a three-day event
window is similar to the event window length
used in previous data breach event studies. Specifically, four of the previous reported studies use
a three-day window with the remaining studies
using either a two-or four-day window. The three-
day cumulative abnormal returns for each firm was
computed as below:
CARi =

Σ

t = –1

ARit

(3)

where
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return for data
breach event i,
ARit is the abnormal return for data breach
event i on day t,
t = 0 is the day the data breach is reported to the
government.
To determine the average overall impact of the
events on the industry, we calculate the three-day
cumulative average abnormal return by summing
across the n firms in the sample and dividing by the
number of firms in the sample as below:

(2)

where ARit is the abnormal return for firm i on day t.
We examine abnormal returns for the three-
day window that includes the event day and the
two trading days immediately before and after the
event. Inclusion of the trading day prior to the
event controls for information leakage that may
occur if some market participants are privy to the
information prior to public announcement. Inclusion of the trading day after the event accounts for
late arrival of information to the market or adjustment to information that requires time for market
participants to interpret the true value effect of the
data breach. A window that is too large will include
extraneous information. Conversely, a window that

+1

CAAR =

24

Σ

i=1

CARi/24

(4)

where
CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal
return across all 24 events in the sample,
CARi is the three-day cumulative return for
data breach event i around the event.
CAAR is the three-day cumulative average abnormal
returns for the sample. To examine whether each
informational event had a significant average return
effect on the industry, a test of the null hypothesis
that the three-
day cumulative average abnormal

		

return across firms equals zero, for H1, is performed
using Patel’s Z-statistic.
3.4 Cross-Sectional Analysis and Matched-Pair
Analysis of Competitive Factors

Cross-sectional analysis is employed to test the three
hypotheses that differences in abnormal returns
across firms are explained by underlying differences
in the firms’ competitive positions in terms of type of
breach or whether the firm is a hotel or a restaurant.
Specifically, multiple regression analysis is used to
examine the relationship between each firm’s market
reaction to their respective data breach events and
three characteristics that are predicted to explain
some of the variation across data breach events.
The first explanatory variable is a dummy variable
that equals one if the breach type is a malicious act
(hack or insider misuse of data) and zero if it is not.
The second independent explanatory variable is
a dummy that equals one if the breach is a repeat
event for the firm involved and zero if it is not.
The third independent explanatory variable is a
dummy variable that equals one if the firm involved
in the breach is a restaurant and zero if it is a hotel.
We estimate the following multiple regression
model for all available observations in the sample:
Model:
(5)
CARi = γ0 + γ1MALi + γ2REPEATi + γ3RESTi
where
CARi

is the three-day cumulative return for
firm i,
is a dummy variable that equals one
MALi
if the type of breach is malicious
(hack or insider misuse of
information),
REPEATi is a dummy variable that equals one
if the breach is a repeat event for the
firm involved,
is a dummy variable that equals one
RESTi
if the firm involved in the breach is a
restaurant,
γ0, γ1, γ2, γ3 are the estimated intercept and three
slope coefficients, respectively.
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Our second and third coefficients represent a test of
H2a that the estimated coefficient on HACK, γ1, will
be zero, and H2b that the estimated coefficient on
REPEAT, γ2, will be zero. Our fourth coefficient is
a test of the H2c hypothesis that predicts the estimated coefficient on REST, γ3, will be zero. The
results of the cross-sectional analysis are discussed
in Section 4.2.
To test the last hypothesis, H2d, a matched-pair
sample of comparable retail firms was selected
based on our sample of hospitality firms. Based on
extensive simulation results, Davies and Kim (2007)
concluded that the best practice for constructing matched samples is to match firms one-to-one
based on market capitalization and share price.
Their results showed that tests based on one-to-one
nearest-neighbor matching have comparable power
and less size distortion than alternatives that place
more weight on distant firms. We have used the
following criteria to select a sample of one-to-one
nearest-neighbor matching of retail firms: a) off-
sample breach is for a retail firm as defined by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, b) off-sample breach is
a one-to-one match for the type of breach, c) off-
sample breach after being matched by “a” and “b” is
chosen as the firm breach such that the firm has the
nearest possible firm size in terms of market capitalization at end of year 2015.
We then test the matched-pair sample by examining the overall industry market reaction to the
reporting date of each data breach event. The market
reaction was determined by measuring daily abnormal returns (ARs) in the same manner as discussed
in Section 3.3. To control for the effects of market-
wide fluctuations, the market model is used to measure expected returns:
Rit = αi + βiRmt + eit

(1)

Table 3 provides a list of the 24 matched-pair
events and the relevant firms, their ticker symbols,
the date the data breaches were reported, and the
type of breach.
Finally, we compare via t-test (unequal variances),
f-test, and Wilcoxon signed rank test the CARs on
a matched-pair basis between the hospitality and
retail firms to determine whether the two samples of
breaches are similar.
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4 Results

4.2 Results of Cross-Sectional and Matched-Pair
Analysis

4.1 Results of Event Testing

Table 4 presents our test of hypothesis H1, which
predicts that there is no effect on stock returns from
data breaches.
CAAR, the cumulative average abnormal return,
is an average of individual firm CARs.
CAAR =

24

Σ

i=1

CARi

(6)

where
CAAR is the cumulative average abnormal return
for the sample of 24 data breach events,
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return
for data breach event i over the event
window.
The CAAR for the hotel and restaurant data breaches
in our sample is −1.24% at a level of significance of
0.062 for the Patel Z-Statistic. There are several different test statistics that are used in event studies. In
other words, the equity values of our sample firms’
equity reduced by an average of 1.24% in response
to the data breaches. We find modest support for
the conclusion that data breaches have a significant
negative impact on the publicly traded hotel and
restaurant firms in our sample.

Table 4. Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR)
over a Three-Day Event Window around the Sample of 24
Data Breaches in Publicly Traded Hospitality Firms
Event Tested
Data Breaches

Three-Day
CAAR1

Pos/Neg2

Patel Z-Statistic
(p-Value)3

−1.24%

10/14

−1.539 (0.0620)

1. CAAR is the average abnormal return for the 24 event breaches
in our sample over the three-day event window, day before, day
of, and day after each data breach event. Abnormal returns are
calculated using an equal weighted market index.
2. More of the firms had negative returns over the three-day event
window.
3. The Patel Z-Statistic is generally recognized as the most
appropriate test statistic for an event study of this type (Bloom,
2011). It is worth noting that a strict cutoff of 5% level of
significance would have us not reject the null hypothesis. However,
the authors think that 6% reflects general support for rejection of
the null given the small sample size in the study.

Table 5 provides a summary of the results of a cross-
sectional regression and hypothesis testing for H2a,
H2b and H2c.
The findings do not reject the null hypotheses
regarding MAL and REPEAT (at the 10% level).
That is, malicious breaches and repeat breaches
are no more, nor less, hurtful to hospitality firms.
However, the coefficient on REST is positive and
has a p-value of 0.056. It is reasonable to conclude
that this provides modest evidence that restaurants
are less negatively impacted by data breaches than
hotels. This may be due to a lower level of preparedness on the part of hotels. This result seems to support the results of the study reported in Hospitality
Technology (2017).
Table 6 presents our test of hypothesis H2d,
which predicts that the stock price reaction to data
breaches is different for hospitality firms as compared with off-sample matched retail firms.
The average abnormal return for the off-sample
retail firms is −0.39% compared to −1.24% in the
hospitality firms. However, the result is insignificant
at the 10% level for all three tests examined. That is, to
test the hypothesis three test statistics are provided a
simple t-test (assuming unequal variances), an f-test,
and a Wilcoxon signed rank test (non-parametric).
The table reveals that all three tests are unable to
reject the null hypothesis of equal means with a 10%
level of significance. Therefore, despite the difference
in means, −1.24% versus −0.39%, we are unable to
claim that the two samples are significantly different.
That is, hospitality firms are not impacted more, or
less, heavily by data breaches than retail firms.
5 Summary, Conclusions, and
Recommendations for Future Research
We examined the market reaction of hotel and
restaurant firms to data breach events. The first
result provided by the study is that there is modest evidence of a significant negative stock price
effect from the average data breach. These negative effects may be attributed to current payments to
customers associated with the breach and possible
future declines in revenue from lost consumer confidence. The 1.24% negative cumulative abnormal
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Table 5. Multiple Regression of Three-Day CARi1 around the Sample of 24 Data Breach Events in Hotel and Restaurant
Publicly Traded Firms
Intercept
MAL2
REPEAT3
REST4
R2 = 0.020764
Regression Significance F = 0.189694378

Coefficients

Standard Error

t-Stat5

P-value

−0.036793139
−0.02739201
0.015268288
0.045785871

0.023025221
0.02134573
0.019793064
0.022605273

–1.597949468
–1.283254791
0.771395859
2.025450966

0.125733901
0.214073835
0.449490894
0.056373842

1. CARi is the three-day cumulative abnormal return for data breach event i around the date of reporting the data breach to the government.
2. MAL is a dummy variable that equals one if the type of breach is a malicious act such as a hack or an insider misuse of information and
zero if it is not.
3. REPEAT is a dummy variable that equals one if the breach is a repeat event for the firm involved and zero if it is not.
4. REST is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm involved in the breach is a restaurant and zero if it is a hotel.
5. This is a two-tailed t-test of the hypothesis that the slope coefficient is not equal to zero. P-values give the level of confidence for the t-test.

return represents approximately a $2.7 billion loss in
the value of these publicly traded hotel and restaurant firms. Second, we find that individual breach
characteristics do not help predict the individual
firm effect. That is, malicious events and repeat
events are no better, nor worse, than other events.
Third, the average hospitality firm faces no more
value risk from a breach than a comparably sized
retail firm. However, restaurants appear to be less
impacted by data breaches than hotel firms. Thus,
managers of hotel firms should raise their level of
concern about potential data breaches because their
firms appear to face greater value at risk from data
breaches than restaurant firms. Managers of hospitality firms should be aware that predicting actualized breach costs based on firm specific data is
Table 6.

Test of Paired Sample with Off-Sample

t-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances

Mean
Variance
Observations
Hypothesized Mean
Difference
df
t-Stat
P(T<=t) one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
Z Value
P(T<=t) one-tail
P(T<=t) two-tail
Wilcoxon Test
Matched Pair
W Value
N

(-1,+1) CAAR
Sample

(-1,+1) CAAR
Off-Sample

−0.012444753
0.002418427
24
0

−0.00392757
0.000459998
24

31
−0.777721579
0.221314242
0.442628484
−0.2571
0.3743
0.79486

141
24
Insignificant at 10%

difficult. This is seen in the lack of significance in
some of the cross-sectional analysis. Finally, managers should not become complacent after a breach
has occurred because subsequent breaches appear to
be just as costly as first-time breaches.
This paper is a first attempt to examine the impact
of data breaches on hospitality firms. The sample size,
at 24 data breaches, is relatively small compared to
many other event studies. Hence it is not surprising
that our summary and conclusions are somewhat
tentative based upon a p-value of 6% for the overall
CAAR. This leads us to three recommendations for
future research. One, when more data breach observations for the hospitality industry become available
the event study analysis should be re-run to verify the
preliminary results provided in this paper. Two, a survey of IT managers would provide a means of understanding the different costs of data breaches. Finally,
since the results provided in this paper represent the
market’s expectation of value effects, a study that
examined post-breach firm performance may provide
insights into the actualized costs of data breaches.
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